

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5246

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 5187

NODIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652 XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR MASS JO US

SUBJECT: SALE OF HAWKS TO JORDAN

1. SUMMAARY: THIS TELEGRAM ADDRESSES JORDANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SALE ASSESSES THE PRESENT JORDANIAN POSITION AND WEIGHTS CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM. THE JORDANIAN POSITION HAS BECOME INCREASILY RIGID. COMPROMISE ON NUMBERS AND MODALITIES OF DELIVERY OF THE HAWKS DOES NOT SEEM POSSIBLE. RELAXATION OF ISRAELI PRESSURE AND THAT OF THEIR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS THROUGH AN IMPROVED CLIMATE IN THE AREA MOST OPTIMISTIC POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE SUCCESS ON SALE. CONGRESS SEEMS TO BE MOTIVATED BY MULTIPLE CONCERNS MAJOR GROUP OF WHICH IS ALSO RELATED TO ISRAELI ATTITUDE. SUBSIDIARY CONCERNS OVER ITS ROLE IN ARMS SALES CASES MIGHT BE SATISFIED BY SEVERAL APPROACHES WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN BASIC INTEGRITY OF THE SALE AND DELIVERIES AND STILL ASSURE CONGRESS A ROLE. (MOST INTERESTING OF THESE IS IDEA FROM SENATOR HUMPHREY OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH CONGRESS ON THE CRITERIA WHICH WOULD GOVERN CONTINUED DELIVERIES.). IF A FACE SAVER IS NEEDED IN SEPTEMBER IN ORDER TO GET THE SALE APPROVED IT IS IN THIS AREA WHERE WE MORE MOST LIKELY TO FIND IT. POST ALSO RECOMMENDS THE US MILITARY REVIEW THE 14 BATTERY SALE AND ITS JUSTIFICATION TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY ASSESSEMENT WHICH WE ARE PRESENT LACK. END SUMMARY.

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2. HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON AND ALSO JUST FINISHED A ROUND OF TALKS WITH KING AND RIFAI, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE OF SOME VALUE TO ASSESS WHERE WE STAND AND SEE WHAT DIRECTIONS WE CAN POINT UP FOR THE FUTURE. THE FORTY TO SIXTY DAYS DELAY BUYS US CONSIDERABLE TIME IN WHICH TO EFFECT THE FINAL OUTCOME. MY REMARKS ON THE CONGRESS AND ITS VIEW ARE MADE AFTER ALMOST TWO WEEKS OF INTENSIVE EXPOSURE BUT OBVIOUSLY SUBJECT TO THE MORE INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH BOB MCCLOCKEY AND HIS PEOPLE HAVING BEEN HAVING OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS.

3. --THE VIEW FROM JORDAN:-- THIS HAS ONLY BEGUN TO BE DISTILLED. AT THE TOP(ING AND RIFAI) SOME HEART HAS BEEN DRAWN FROM THE FOLLOWING FACTS AND DEVELOPMENTS (A) THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS ASKED FOR TIME AND THE ISRAELI LOBBY STEAMROLLER AGAINST THE SALE HAS BEEN STOPPED FOR THE MOMENT. (B) THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS KEPT FAITH WITH ITS COMMITMENTS TO JORDAN. (C) THERE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CLIMATE WILL IMPROVE--A NEW INTERIM AGREEMENT AND (A MIXED BLESSING FOR JORDAN AND THE ARABS) THE PENDING ISRAELI ARMS REQUESTS MAY GO FORWARD. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE THE TOP LEADERS HERE ARE (A) STILL AWARE OF THE ENORMOUS PRESSURE BEING EXERTED BY CONGRESS (B) DISPAIRING THAT WE CANNOT PULL OFF THE OPPOSITION ENTIRELY (C) PAINTED INTO A TOUGH CORNER ON ANY COM-PROMISES THAT WOULD CHANGE NUMBERS OR DELIVERY SCHEDULES OR HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR DOING SO (THIS PROBABLY INCLUDES ALLOWING FOR A FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL VETO ON DELIVERIES) AND (D) COMMITTED BUT NOT HAPPY ABOUT IT TO GOING TO THE SYRIANS AND SOVIETS IF OUR DEAL FALLS THROUGH.

4. THE MAN IN THE STREET OR IN GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER COUNTED FOR MUCH HERE. HOWEVER OUR VERY PRELIMINARY REPORTS ON POPULAR REACTION SHOW TWO VIEWS EMERGING. THE MORE SKEPTICAL WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES MORE SAVVY SAY THAT WITH THE ISRAELIS AGAINST US IT IS LOST ANYWAY AND THE SEMI EUPHORIA INDUCED BY THE POSTPONEMENT AND POSITIVE OFFICIAL REACTION TO IT HERE IS JUST BUILDING FOR A FALL. THE LET DOWN WILL ONLY BE ENHANCED. THE
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OTHERVIEW WE GATHER MORE COMMON AMONG MILITARY LOYALISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE KING, IS THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE SITUATION IS MORE POSITIVE. REGULAR COOPERATION CONTINUES WITH THE MILITARY UNDIMINISHED. (AND AS AS ASIDE, I BELIEVE FOR LOCAL MORALE PURPOSES THIS SHOULD KEEP UP, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME INITIAL SIGNS THAT PERHAPS AMONG US CONTRACTORS AND EVEN IN THE PENTAGON THERE IS SOME RETHINKING GOING ON. FROM OUR

POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO DO ANY
THING WHICH UPSETS OUR PRESENT TIMETABLE OF WORK ON AIR
DEFENSE QUESTIONS IN PARTICULAR AND I RECOMMEND STRONGLY
AGAINST ANY SUCH UPSETS.

5. ASSESSMENT:-- AS A PRELIMINARY TO WHERE WE GO OVER THE
NEXT MONTH OR TWO, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO SET DOWN AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND FORCES OPERATION ON THIS
PROBLEM AS WE SEE THEM.

6. --JORDAN"" THE KING WANTS AND NEEDS AN AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEM. HE BELIEVES THE 14 BATTERY HAWK REQUEST IS
ESSENTIAL. HE HAS MADE ENOUGH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENT
TO INDICATE THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN
HIS APPROACH. THE ISSUE FOR HIM IS AS MUCH POLITICAL AS
MILITARY. THE US HAS BECOME A SIGNIFICANTLY MORE SUS-
PECT FACTOR IN HIS POLITICAL LIFE AS IT BECOMES
INCREASILY APPARENT THAT WE CANNOT OPERATE AS A "DEUS
EX MACHINA" IN THE MIDDLE EAST(A CHANGE FROM THE FIRST
TWO DISENGAGEMENTS WHICH KING FELT WERE PUT ACROSS IN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5247

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 AMMAN 5187

NODIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

RATHER EASY FASHION) AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THAT THE
CONGRESS HAS TAKEN ON A ROLE OF OVERRIDING AND "NEGA-
TIVING" THE POSITIVE COMMITMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH. THIS FUTURE LACK OF COMPLETE TRUST IS
ENHANCED BY THE SOUTHEAST ASIA EXPERIENCE AND RECENT
ACTION ON TURKISH BASES AND HAS IRONICALLY FURTHER
PUSHED JORDANIANS IN DIRECTION OF ACQUIRING A MORE

COMPLETE MILITARY CAPABILITY FROM US, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE BECAUSE THEY HAVE GROWING DOUBTS WE CAN OR WILL COME TO THEIR AID IN A CRUNCH.

7. KINGS PERSONAL VIEW NOT UNINFLUENCED BY RIFAI WILL BE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION IN HOW WE PROCEED WITH JORDANIANS. RIGHT NOW HE FEELS DEEPLY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF POTENTIAL HUMILIATION AT HANDS OF ISRAELIS THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE US CONGRESS. BUT THE ISSUE IS OF EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE. HIS NEW FOUND RAPPROCHMENT WITH THE ARAB WORLD ALLOWS HIM TO LOOSEN IF HE WISHES LONG HELD TIES WITH US. HE THUS CAN DO THIS WITH MORE EASE, BUT HE IS BOTH WORRIED ABOUT HAVING ONLY A SYRIAN/SOVIET ALTERNATIVE AND IS IN SOME REAL ANGUISH ABOUT CUTTING HIS RELATIONS WITH THE US WHICH HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDING AND HELPFUL TO HIM IN THE PAST, BUT WHICH NOW SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY LESS TRUSTWORTHY, AND MORE MERCURIAL.

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8. AS FAR AS THE KING IS CONCERNED, WHAT WE MUST AVOID IS THE FOLLOWING (A) CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE SALE BASICALLY THE ORDERING AND DELIVERY OF 14 HAWK BATTERIES IF AT ALL POSSIBLE AND (B) OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH PUT SALE OR DELIVERY IN SERIOUS DOUBT AND THEREBY TEND TO PUT KING AND JORDAN IN PUBLIC SECOND CLASS STATUS OR WHICH HUMILIATE HIM BY BEING TOUTED IN US PRESS AS AN ISARELI VICTORY". AND (C) FUTURE APPROACHES TO KING SHOULD BE CAREFUL BALANCE OF FRANK TALKING REALITY TEMPERED WITH SERIOUS CARE AND CONSIDERATION FOR KINGS. PERSONAL SENSITIVITIES. WE SHOULD AVOID AT ALL COSTS PUTTING HIM ANY FARTHER INTO A CORNER PRESSURING HIM OR ALLOWING HIM NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES. IF COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE ABOVE CONSTRAINTS IT IS A VERY LIMITED COMPROMISE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY HANDLED. WHAT MIGHT BE EASIEST FOR KING TO ACCEPT IS SOMETHING EXCLUSIVELY BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE WHICH WE WOULD ASSURE HIM DID NOT AFFECT OUR BASIC COMMITMENT ON THE SALE AND WHICH COULD BE REASONABLY INTERPRETED BY HIM AS SUCH IN SPITE OF THE PROBABLE NECESSITY FOR PUBLIC CONGRESSIONAL CLAIM THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED A REAL CONCESSION.

9. --CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:: (I DESCRIBE WHAT THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE WHEN I LEFT WASHINGTON JULY 27 I RECOGNIZE THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS MAY CHANGE OR HAVE CHANGED) THE CONGRESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BOTHERED BY A NUMBER OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE SALE--THOSE CONCERNED WITH ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES: THOSE DERIVED FROM

CONGRESS DESIRE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN ARMS SALES AND THE "ARMS CONTROL" CONSIDERATION MOST EASILY SUMMARIZED BY THE PLEA THAT WE PUT A TIGHT LID ON ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS A MATTER OF POLICY.

10. THE ISRAELI RELATED CONCERNS SEEM TO BE CHARACTERIEC BY BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE WHEN THE UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES OF A JOINT COMMAND WITH SYRIAN, PLO RETURN TO JORDAN, AND INCREASED SUSCEPTIBILITY OF JORDAN TO GO TO WAR ARE DISCARDED THERE ARE THE RELATED QUESTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION BRINGING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL BY THE SALE
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AND THE ISRAELI CONCERN THAT LANCE AND F-15 ARE BEING HELD UP UNFAIRLY WHILE WE GO AHEAD WITH HAWKS FOR JORDAN. ON THE DISTINCTLY MILITARY SIDE THERE SEEMED TO BE GENUINE CONCERN THAT 14 HAWK BATTERIES WOULD MAKE A REAL MILITARY DIFFERENCE FOR ISRAEL. THIS WAS TRANS-LATED BY SOME OF THE FRANKER LOBBYISTS AND ON ONE OCCASION IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BY SENATOR BAKER AS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO ENJOY PRETTY MUCH UNOPPOSED AND FREE USE OF JORDAN AIR SPACE FOR (A) RECONNAISSANCE IN PEACE TIME OR JORDAN AND ACCESS TO SYRIA FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. (B) A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AND AND FOLLOW UP AIR ATTACKS THROUGH JORDAN AND AGAINST SYRIA IN THE EVENT OF WAR. (C) FOR RIPOSTES AGAINST SYRIAN IN THE EVENT OF A SYRIAN ATTACK ON ISRAEL. AND (D) FINALLY FOR ATTACKS ON JORDAN SHOULD THEY BE NECESSARY PREEMPTIVELY OR RESPONSIVELY. AND OF COURSE THIS BECOMES THE HEART OF THE MILITARY ISSUE. AN AIR DEFENSE CAPACITY OVER AND THROUGH JORDAN SOMEWHAT LESS EFFECTIVE, BUT GENERAL BROWN DID MAKE CLEAR IN TESTIMONY THAT THE FULL 14 BATTERIES WOULD PROBABLY REPRESENT LESS THAN A ONE DAY HOLD UP IN FULL SCALE WAR FOR THE ISRAELIS. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MILITARY ISSUE IS JORDAN'S "OFFENSIVE CAPACITY" INTENT IN THE HAWK AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. GENERALLY SPEAKING THAT ISSUE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEFUSED WITH AN EXPLANATION TO CONGRESS OF THE CONCEPT OF AREA DEFENSE BY FIXED SITES: LOW HAWK MOBILITY AND ISRAELI ARTILLERY CAPABILITY AGAINST HAWK SITED TO HAVE AN OFFENSIVE OR INTERVENTION CAPACITY AGAINST ISRAELI PEACE TIME FLYING.

11. THERE IS LITTLE ROOM FOR REASSURING THE CONGRESS ON THE INCREASED DEFENSIVE CAPACITY WHICH JORDAN WOULD GAIN EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT A SOVIET DEFENSE SYSTEM BOUGHT BY JORDAN MIGHT BE LARGER TECHNICALLY TOUGHER TO CRACK AND PROBABLY MORE MOBILE AND THUS

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 AMMAN 5187

NODIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

MORE OF AN OFFENSIVE THREAT. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE
OBVIOUSLY IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ALLOWED US TO MOVE
AHEAD ON ISARELI WEAPONS REQUESTS WE WOULD REMOVE
THE "PRESSURE ARGUMENT IN CONGRESS AND ALSO THE
PROBLEMAS OUR CRITICS SEE IT, OF EVEN HANDEDNESS
TOWARD ISRAEL TO SAY NOTHING OF AN IMPROVED CLIMATE
AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS ALSO PROBABLY NOT
UNTHINKABLE THAT AS A PRICE FOR MOVING ON ISRAELI
WEAPONS REQUESTS WE COULD DEMAND AND EXPECT SOME
RELATION#IN ISRAELI PRESSURE ON OUR OUT#DEAL WITH
JORDAN ALTHOUGH I SAY THIS WITHOUT ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE
OF WHAT OTHER TRADES MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED IN ANY
RENEWAL OF THE PROVISION OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
(LANCE F-15) TO ISRAEL.

12 ON THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF CONGRESS, THERE
MIGHT BE FURTHER ROOM FOR ACCOMMODATION. IT IS NOT
UNLIKE THAT CONGRESS AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE
WITH THE JORDAN AIR DEFENSE CASE, WILL SEEK TO AMEND
SOON THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT IN A NUMBER OF WAYS,
INCLUDING POSSIBLY PROVIDING FOR MORE TIME THAT THE
PRESENT 20 CALENDAR DAYS TO CONSIDER A REQUEST, SEEKING
A POSITIVE "APPROVAL" AND ALSO SEEKING SOME PLACE FOR
THEMSELVES IN CONTINUING TO REVIEW FUTURE DELIVERIES IN
SALES CASES COVERING MULTIPLE YEARS I AM NOT COUNSELING
PREEMPTIVE CAPITULATION HERE BUT ONLY POINTING OUT

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WHATMIGHT BE COMING IN ANY VENT FROM MY CONVERSATION ON THE HILL. WHAT IS ALSO TRUE IS THAT THE CONGRESS COULD IMPOSE ITS VIEW ON THE JORDAN SALE AND DELIVERIES ON THE EXECUTIVE AT SOME TIMEIN THE FUTURE BY PASSING A STATUTE, OVERRIND THE VETO OF THE PRESIDENT IF THEY HAD THE VOTES OR BY THE SLIGHTLY ONLY LESS SUBTLE DEVICE OF "VETO PROOFING" THEIR ACTION BY ATTACHING IT AS AN AMENDSAY#SAY TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT WITHIN WHICH IN ANY EVENT FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT AMMENDMENTS ARE USUALLY INCORPORATED. THE LATTER MOVE PROBABLY WOULD MAKE THE PRICE OF A ETO#ON THE JORDAN CASE MUCH TOO HIGH A ONE TO PAY IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON DELAYING OR STOPPING OUR TOTAL FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS. THIS APPROACH TOO HAS NOT ESCAPED THE CONGRESS. THEREFORE WHILE AN AMENDMMNT TO THE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE FOR SOME CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE CONGRESS AS WAS PROPOSED IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE KING,SOME EXECTIVE BRANCH UNDERAKING OF A LESSER CHARACTER MIGHT SATISFY THE CONGRESS BY ACCEPT-ABLE TO THE KING AND BE LESS RESTRICTIVE THAN WHAT MAY LATER BE IMPOSED ON THE EXECUTIVE BY THE CONGRESS IN ANY EVENT. I REALIZE THIS TYPE OF THINKING HAS NEVER BEEN VERY POPULAR IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUT THROW IT INTO THE HOPPER BECAUSE OUR ALTERNATIVES AT PRSENT ARE SO DRASTICALLY LIMTED.

13. SPECIFICALLY WHAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED IS A STATEMENT TO THE CONGRESS THAT THE EXECUTIVE WOULD BE BOUND TO HALT FUTURE DELIVERIES OF HAWKS BY S AY#A FIVE EIGHTS OR A TWO THIRDS VOTE INBOTH HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES OR AT LEAST BE PREPARED TO RENEGOTIATE WITH THE KING AT SOME FUTURE TIME ON THE ISSUES THAT PRODUCED THAT KIND OF A VOTE. SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT BE ALSO MORE ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURALLY TO THE CONGRESS THAT PUSH-ING THE ISSUE TO THE FLOOR FOR A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVALAS PREVIOUSLYREQUIRED I CANNOT REALLY SAY WHETHER THIS APPROACH WOULD FLY HEREAND CAN ONLY RECOMMEND THAT IT BE LOOKED AT FURTHER IN WASHINGTON.

14. ANOTHER MEANS OF APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF AN ENHANCEMENT CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FUTURE DELIVERIES UNDER

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THIS SALE MIGHT BE TO BIND THE EXECUTIVE A LITTLE MORE

FIRMLY ON WHAT CRITERIA IT WOULD APPLY UNDER THE NORMAL DOD CONTRACT CLAUSE WHICH ALLOWS TERMINATION FOR ANY REASON. FOR THE CONGRESS WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IDEA THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO JORDANIAN "MISUSE" OF THE HAWKS. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OUR CREDIBILITY WITH JORDAN THE CRITERIA WOULD HAVE TO BE RELATED TO AND SOME AMPLIFICATION OF THE EXISTING CRITERIA--THAT THE WEAPONS BE USED IN SELF DEFENSE AND NOT TRANSFERRED TO A THIRD COUNTRY. THE FORMER WOULD HELP TO ANSWER THE OPPOSITION ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL IS THREATENED BY OFFENSIVE JORDANIAN ACTIONS: THE LATTER THAT THE WEAPONS WOULD GO TO SYRIA UNDER A JOINT COMMAND OR FALL INTO COMMUNISTS HANDS. SPECIFICALLY WE COULD TELL CONGRESS AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE KING THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSULT WITH THEM AND IF WE HAD INFORMATION WHICH THEY (AND WE) BELIEVED WAS CONCLUSIVE ENOUGH TO HOLD UP DELIVERIES ON FUTURE HAWKS UNDER THE SELF DEFENSE RUBIC SHOULD IF JORDAN FOR EXAMPLE (A) USE THE WEAPONS IN AN AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL OR TO PROVIDE ISRAELI AGGRESSION. (B) SEVERELY ALTER ITS RELATIONSHIP OF TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND (C) CHANGE IT POLICY OF SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED PEACE. ON THE TRANSFER ISSUE WE COULD STIPULATE THE SAME ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE IF JORDAN TRANSFERRED THE MISSILES: (A) TO SYRIAN CONTROL OR IF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH SYRIA MADE FOR THE SAME RESULT (B) TO THE PLO OR (C) ALLOWED COMMUNIST NATIONALS ACCESS TO THEM. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE TRANSFER ISSUES WOULD CAUSE THE KING ANY PROBLEMS AS LONG AS WE MADE CLEAR THE SAME CRITERIA HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY USED TO DECIDE THESE ISSUES. I AM LESS SURE ABOUT THE FIRST POINT CERTAINLY HE WOULD FIND IT HARD TO OBJECT TO CONTINUING POLICIES OF NON AGGRESSION NON PROVOCATION AND FAVORING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE CONTINUING GOOD RELATION WITH THE US ISSUE MIGHT BE A LITTLE HARDER FOR HIM BUT WE COULD EXPLAIN THAT SUCH AN ISSUE RELATED ONLY TO GROSS CHANGES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. HE WILL NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF SPECIAL CONDITIONS ON THE

NOTE BY OC/T: AMMAN 5187 SECTION 3 #AS RECEIVED.

CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. SECRET

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5249

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 AMMAN 5187

NODIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

SALE, BUT TO THE EXTENT THEY WERE INTERPRETED AS A SPELL-
ING OUT OF NORMAL GUIDELINES THEY MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE
AGREEABLE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS I BELIEVE WE SHOULD
NOT LET THE SALE FOUNDER FOR LACK OF TRYING SOMETHING
LIKE THIS OUT ON HIM ESPECIALLY IF WE HADA REASONABLE
EXPECTATION THAT SUCH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO A MAJORITY
ON THE COMMITTEE.

15. FINALLY THERE IS THE OVERALL ISSUE OF CONGRESSIONAL
UNHAPPINESS ABOUT THE LEVEL OF OUR ARMS SALES TO THE
MIDDLE EAST. HERE I BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO REAL
COMPROMISE WITH OUR BASIC POSITION THAT WE KEEP FAITH
WITH JORDAN ON THE SIZE AND MODALITIES OF THE SALE. TO
DO LESS WILL ALSO DO SERIOUS HARM TO RELATIONS WITH OUR
TRADITIONAL CUSTOMERS SUCH AS IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA.

16. --EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSIDERATIONS:-- IN SIMPLEST TERMS
I SSUME WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IS PERMISSION FOR THE
HAWK SALE TO GO AHEAD WITH A MINIMUM CONCESSION TO THE
CONGRESS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL VARIETY ON ONE HAND AND
THE RAISING OF MINIMUM PROBLEMS WITH THE JORDANIANS BY
MODIFICATION OF THE SALE OR ITS TERMS ON THE OTHER
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS NOT ACHIEVABLE IN JULY IT MIGHT BE
WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES IN SEPTEMBER IF THE CLIMATE IS
SUFFICIENTLY ALTERED VIS-A-VIS ISRAELI OPPOSITION AS
SUGGESTED EARLIER IN PARA 11.

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17. IN THE MEANTIME WE SEE ONE SIGNIFICANT HOLE IN OUR
PREPARATIONS FOR TUE RH WORK WHICH NEEDS TO BE PLUGGED
AND WHICH MAY ALSO HELP TACTICALLY AT LEAST WITH THE

CONGRESS. SINCE THE 14 BATTERIES OF HAWKS REPRESENTS IN A LARGE PART A COMPROMISE OF A POLITICAL VARIETY AND THE MILITARY JUSTIFICATION IS MAINLY JORDANIAN, WE NEED TO HAVE A GOOD LOOK AT THE MILITARY ASPECTS OURSELVES. WHEREOF SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF A DOD AIR DEFENSE FOLLOW ON TEAM TO REVIEW JORDAN HAWK REQUIREMENTS. WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE EFFORT DOES NOT PREJUDICE OUR COMMITMENT TO 14 IF THAT IS WHAT JORDAN WANTS, BUT WILL PROVIDE FURTHER BACKGROUND ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR 14. THE NEED FOR THIS STUDY IS PREMISED ON THE FOLLOWING

(A) ORIGINAL JADAT REPORT RECOMMENDED SIX HAWK PACKAGE BASED IN PART ON MONEY CONSTRAINT AND WAS NOT THUS A PURELY MILITARY REVIEW.

(B) JADAT MIX WAS HAWK CHAPARRAL VULCAN AND AIRCRAFT (F-5E) PRESENT MIX IS HAWK VULCAN REDEYE AND AIRCRAFT (F-5E)

(C) DEFENSE OF HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS BY HAWK OTHER THAN AMMAN/ZERKA NOT ADDRESSED BY JADAT.

(D) DEFENSE OF PLANNED AIR BASES AND RADAR SITES BY HAWK NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED

(E) OVERALL DEFINITION OF CURRENT CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENSE OF JORDAN NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED.

A SMALL TEAM COULD PREPARE A REPORT BY SEPTEMBER ONE. THE EARLIER REPORT WAS PUT TOGETHER WITH ONLY A WEEK TO TEN DAYS IN JORDAN. A MORE COMPLETE REPORT COULD HELP GAIN GREATER CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OFFSET SOME OF THE CRITICAL MILITARY TESTIMONY (ZUMWALT) AND THE EXAGGERATION IN THE PRESS OF OTHER (GEN BROWN) AND SERVE AS A DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD FAITH WITH THE CONGRESS. IT HAS SOME DRAWBACKS IF NOT CAREFULLY HANDLED, I.E., COULD BE SEEN AS MORE SELF JUSTIFICATION AND COULD CONCEIVABLY CONCLUDE THAT THE PRESENT MIX IS NOT JUSTIFIABLE MILITARILY. ON BALANCE WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS APPROACH BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION I BELIEVE KING WOULD BE UPSET IF HE SAW REPORT AS AN EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE HIM DOWN BUT IF HE SAW IT AS A BASIS FOR MORE ACCURATE JUSTIFICATION OF OUR POSITION HE WOULD I BELIEVE COOPERATE. IN ANY EVENT REPORT MAY NOT NEED
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MORE DATA THAN WE COULD DEVELOP HERE THROUGH OUR REGULAR CONTACTS AND TELEGRAPH BACK TO DOD.

18. --TIMING AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATION.-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IS TO BLOCK THE CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTION TO THE SALE OF HAWKS ON ONE OF THE HOUSES OF CONGRESS SO THAT THE SALE MAY PROCEED. GIVEN A NEGATIVE HOUSE COMMITTEE ACTION AND THE ASSUMED LIKELIHOOD OF GREATER OPPOSITION ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE WE SUSPECT THE MAIN ARENA FOR ACTION WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE SENATE COMMITTEE. IF WE CAN CONVINCE THE SENATE COMMITTEE IT

IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE WILL DROP ITS
OPPOSITION AND NOT PUSH THE QUESTION TO THE FLOOR. WE
ARE CONCERNED HOWEVER BY THE ASSESSMENT OF SOME OF OUR
SENATE SUPPORTERS THAT IF THE ISSUE GETS TO THE SENATE
FLOOR WE WILL LOSE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS POSSIBLE
FOR THE RESOLUTION TO REACH THE SENATE FLOOR BY REFERRAL
FROM THE HOUSE EVEN THOUGH WE SUCCEED IN BLOCKING IT IN
THE SENATE COMMITTEE. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL FOR US TO
HAVE CONFIRMATION OF THIS POINT HERE SINCE THE JORDANIANS
WILL NEED TO KNOW THIS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND OUR TACTICS.

19. WE ALSO RESUME NO FURTHER ACTION WILL TAKE PLACE IN
CONGRESS UNTIL THE RECESS ENDS ON SEPTEMBER 4. IF BY THAT
TIME THE
CHANGED CLIMATE MAKES NO OBJECTION TO THE SALE
POSSIBLE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER EFFORTS ON OUR PART THEN WE
AND JORDANIANS COULD NOT BE MORE PLEASED. IF NOT WE
SHOULD PREPARE NOW FOR THE CONTINGENCY THAT SOME FACE
SAVOR WILL BE REQUIRED. WE HAVE SUGGESTED SEVERAL
POSSIBILITIES AND RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT STUDY
THESE CAREFULLY. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO CONTRIBUTE REACTIONS
FROM HERE TO FURTHER SPECIFICS. WE ESPECIALLY COMMENT TO
YOUR ATTENTION THE "CRITERIA" FOR FUTURE NON-DELIVERY
WHICH GROWS OUT OF A SUGGESTION BY SENATOR HUMPHREY AND
HIS STAFF. BEFORE MAKING ANY RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRESENTATION
OF ANY SUCH EFFORT TO JORDANIANS WE WILL HAVE
TO HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES AND
ISRAELI VIEWS WHICH ARE PROBABLY NOT LIKELY TO BE
AVAILABLE UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 4.

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WPM ACTION REQUESTED

(A) RESPONSE TO QUESTION IN PARA 18 ON FLOOR ACTION.

(B) STUDY VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES PLUS OTHERS WHICH MAY
OCCUR TO THE DEPARTMENT AS OUTLINED IN PARA 11, 13
AND 14 OF THIS TELEGRAM

(C) CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MILITARY STUDY
AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 17.

PICKERING

NOTE BY OC/T: PARA 17 AS RECEIVED.

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Concepts: MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MILITARY SALES, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CENTRAL LEGISLATURE, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL SUMMARIES, CAT-B
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Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Review Media Identifier:
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Subject: SALE OF HAWKS TO JORDAN
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, US, IS
To: STATE
Type: TE
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